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TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON U. S. MILITARY POSTURE

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TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1983

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United States Senate
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, D. C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m. in Room SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Hon. John Tower [chairman] presiding.

Present: Senators Tower, Thurmond, Goldwater, Warner, Humphrey, Cohen, Jepsen, Quayle, East, Wilson, Jackson, Stennis, Nunn, Hart, Exon, Levin, Kennedy and Bingaman.

Staff Members Present: James F. McGovern, Staff Director and Chief Counsel; James G. Roche, Minority Staff Director; Alan R. Yuspeh, General Counsel; Paul C. Besozzi, Minority Counsel; Brenda K. Hudson, Assistant Chief Clerk; Anthony J. Principe, Counsel, Willis D. Smith, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Scientist for the Minority; Ann E. Sauer, Special Assistant; Gerald D. Strickler, Printing and Documents Clerk; Louis W. Army, III, Professional Staff Member; Michael B. Donley, Professional Staff Member; Robert S. Dotson, Professional Staff Member; Frank J. Gaffney, Professional Staff Member; George K. Johnson, Jr., Professional Staff Member; Jose E. Martinez, Professional Staff Member; Patrick

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18 Senator Tower: Senator Hart.

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7 Another thing that has led to overruns is the start and
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